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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL 
CONSENT TO ABORTION 
STATUTE 
Malena R. Calvin* 
"Who of us is mature enough for offspring before the offspring 
themselves. arrive? The value of marriage is not that adults pro-
duce children but that children produce adults.'" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court determined in 
Roe v. Wade 2 that the constitutional right to privacy included a 
woman's right to an abortion. Since Roe,3 the issue of abortion 
has been at the center of debate and controversy. Recently, the 
abortion controversy has focused on the rights of minors to re-
ceive abortions. One aspect of this controversy is the ability of 
pregnant minors to receive abortions free from parental consent. 
The issue of parental consent. to abortion has caused courts to 
balance conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, 
courts want to promote family autonomy, while on the other 
hand, courts must consider the rights of minors. 
The Supreme Court first addressed the rights of states to 
regulate abortions for minors in 1976 in Planned Parenthood v. 
• The author is currently practicing law with Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn 
in Los Angeles. B. A. 1988, Howard University; J. D. 1991, Howard University School of 
Law. All matters of opinion contained in this article-legal and otherwise-are those of 
the author alone. 
1. BARNES & NOBLE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (R. Fitzhenry ed. 1986)(statement of Peter 
de Vries). 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3. [d. 
591 
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Danforth. 4 Since Danforth, 56% of all states have enacted stat-
utes which regulate a minor's ability to obtain an abortion.1i Cur-
rently, 36% of all states have adopted statutes which require mi-
nors to obtain parental consent in order to procure an abortion,S 
while another 20% have adopted statutes which require parental 
notification.7 California Health and Safety Code Section 25958 
("Section 25958") is one of many statutes which requires minors 
to obtain parental consent in order to receive an abortion.s Sec-
tion 25958 provides that minors must obtain parental consent or 
the permission of the juvenile court before obtaining an abor-
tion.9 Although Section 25958 has not been considered by the 
Supreme Court, Danforth and its progeny indicate what states 
should consider when enacting such statutes and whether ex-
isting statutes should be deemed constitutional. Therefore, Cali-
fornia's statute must be analyzed pursuant to the standards set 
forth by the Supreme Court. Although this analysis may deter-
mine the constitutionality of California's statute under federal 
law, California law presents a unique problem because of the ex-
press right to privacy found in California's state constitution. 
4. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
5. See infra notes 6·7. 
6. See ALA. CODE §§ 26·21·1 to 26·21·8 (Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(3) 
(1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36·2152 to 36·2153 (Supp. 1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West 1989); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5·2.5 (West Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Baldwin 1990); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 
12S (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41·41-51 to 41·41·63 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.1·03.1 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18, § 3206 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 23·4.7·6 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
44·41·30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A·7 (1990); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (1990); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-118 (Supp. 1990). 
7. See GA. CODE ANN. § 18·609(6) (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980); 
MD. HEALTH·GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20·107 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie 1986); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4·202(0 (1982); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 16·2F·3 (1990). Notice statutes are 
not equivalent to consent statutes because notice statutes require only that the parents 
be informed of the abortion. Under a notice statute, the parents do not have any author-
ity with respect to the minor's decision to have an abortion. See H.L.V. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398 (1981)(holding that statutes requiring a physician to notify, if possible, the par· 
ents of an unemancipated minor are not violative of the minor's constitutional rights). 
See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990)(holding that a statute which reo 
quires that both parents be notified as a condition to abortion is unconstitutional unless 
judicial bypass is provided). 
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1990). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 25 
(West 1982)(a minor is any person under 18 years of age). 
9. CAL. HEALTH &. SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1990). 
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In order to determine the constitutionality of California's 
parental consent statute, this article will first discuss the impli-
cations of Roe. Second, this article will analyze United States 
Supreme Court decisions which have addressed parental consent 
statutes. Third, this paper will demonstrate that California's pa-
rental consent statute would be considered constitutional under 
the Supreme Court cases which have addressed such statutes. 
Fourth, this paper will consider the implications of California's 
state constitution. Based on this analysis, this paper will estab-
lish that despite a finding of constitutionality under federal law, 
California's parental consent statute appears to violate the ex-
press right to privacy found in the California Constitution. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ROE V. WADE 
Roe established the current abortion policy in the United 
States.10 It involved a. Texas statute which provided that the 
procurement of an abortion was a crime except when performed 
to save the life of the mother.ll The plaintiff, a pregnant woman 
who wanted to terminate her pregnancy, challenged the statute 
on the ground that it violated her constitutional rights. 12 After 
considering various opposing views,13 the Supreme Court held 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated a wo-
man's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court stated that the "right of privacy, ... founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."14 
Although the Court held that a woman's constitutional 
10. P. SHEERAN. WOMEN, SOCIETY, THE STATE, AND ABORTION 8 (1987). 
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117. At the time Roe was decided, 60% of all states had 
adopted similar statutes. Id. at 118 n.2. 
12. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statute. Id. at 120. 
13. In reaching its decision, the Court considered the positions of several groups 
including the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, 
and the American Bar Association. 
14. Id. at 153. 
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rights include the right to choose an abortion, the Court empha-
sized that this right is not unlimited. III The Court stated that 
"the privacy right involved ... cannot be said to be absolute. "16 
The right to choose an abortion "must be considered against im-
portant state interest in regulation."17 The Court explained that 
fundamental rights may be regulated by the state if: (1) the reg-
ulation is justified by a compelling state interest;18 and (2) if the 
regulation is narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state 
interest that is involved.19 
The Court recognized that the state may have a compelling 
interest in the health of the mother during her pregnancy. The' 
Court, however, did not believe that this interest became com-
pelling until the fetus could be considered a person. The Court 
concluded that the fetus did not become a person until the end 
of the first trimester of pregnancy. Prior to the end of the first 
trimester, "the fetus, at most, represent[ed] only the potentiality 
of life."20 The Court stated that "[f]or the period of pregnancy 
prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in con-
sultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regula-
tion by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's 
pregnancy should be terminated. "21 
In order to clarify its position with respect to the State's 
ability to regulate abortions, the Court set forth a model for 
states to follow. The model was based on the theory that a wo-
man's pregnancy is divided into three stages. The model pro-
vided that: (1) For the stage prior to approximately the end of 
the first trimester, the woman, in consultation with her physi-
cian, could decide whether to have an abortion; (2) For the stage 
subsequent to the end of the first trimester, the State could reg-
ulate the abortion procedure in ways that reasonably related to 
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 154. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.s. 621, 627 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 
(1963». 
19. [d. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 
(1940». 
20. [d. at 162. 
21. [d. at 163. 
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the mother's health; and (3) For the stage subsequent to viabil-
ity, the State could regulate the abortion procedure, except 
where the abortion is necessary for the preservation of the 
mother's life.22 
Although the Court in Roe attempted to set forth a straight-
forward model "against which all burdensome abortion restric-
tions ... were to be compared,"23 Roe created tremendous con-
troversy24 and left many questions unanswered. 211 Two important 
questions that Roe did not address were whether and to what 
extent did the Roe model apply to minors. 
After Roe, many states enacted statutes which limited a mi-
nor's ability to obtain an abortion. Some of these statutes re-
quired that a minor's parents be notified as a condition to abor-
tion. Other statutes required parental consent. These statutes 
seemed to contradict Roe because they did not follow the model 
set forth in Roe. However, it was not until three years after Roe 
that the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of pa-
rental consent statutes. 
B. SUPREME COURT CASES WHICH ADDRESS STATUTES REQUIRING 
PARENTAL CONSENT To ABORTION 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of 
a state's right to require a minor to obtain parental consent to 
abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 26 Danforth in-
22. See Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the 
Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881 (1989). (Wardle states that, "while Webster 
hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement of the Roe abortion privacy doctrine (unless 
the ring is a death knell), the hard core of that doctrine '[fJor today, at least, ... stand[sl 
undisturbed.''' Id. at 907 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Service, 109 S. Ct. 
3040, 3079 (1989)). 
23. L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPENDIUM AND CRITIQUE OF 
FEDERAL COURT ABORTION CASES xii (1981). 
24. Since Roe, it is estimated that approximately 19 million legal abortions have 
been performed in the United States. Between 1973 and 1982, the number of abortions 
performed more than doubled from 744,6000 to 1,557,900. P. SHEERAN, supra note 10, at 
14. 
25. L. WARDLE, supra note 23, at xiii (stating that since Roe, "more than 150 re-
ported opinions dealing with substantive abortion issues have been rendered by the fed-
eral courts, including more than 100 reported district court opinions, 45 recorded court 
of appeals decisions, and a dozen additional Supreme Court opinions." Id.). 
26. 428 U.S. 52 (1975). 
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volved a Missouri statute which set forth, inter aiia,27 a parental 
consent provision which required unmarried minors to obtain 
parental consent as a condition to abortion, unless the abortion 
was certified by a physician as necessary in order to preserve the 
life of the mother.2B Thus, in the absence of parental consent or 
life threatening circumstances, an unmarried minor would be de-
nied an abortion. 
The appellants challenged the statute on the ground that 
the result "[i]s the ultimate supremacy of the parents' desires 
over those of the minor child, the pregnant patient."29 The ap-
pellees, on the other hand, contended that "a State's permitting 
a child to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an adult 
'who has responsibility or concern for the child would constitute 
an irresponsible abdication of the State's duty to protect the 
welfare of minors.' "30 The district court reasoned that the State 
had a compelling interest "in safeguarding the authority of the 
family relationship."31 On that basis, it upheld the constitution-
ality of the parental consent provision. On direct appeal, the Su-
preme Court reversed the district court's determination. In 
reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the Missouri stat-
ute was a "blanket" provision amounting to an absolute veto 
power "over the decision of the physician and his patient to ter-
minate the patient's pregnancy."32 The Court declared the stat-
ute to be unconstitutional on the grounds that "the State does 
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an 
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over such a decision.33 
In reaching its decision the Court reaffirmed prior Supreme 
Court decisions defining the constitutional rights of minors. 
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magi-
cally only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. 
27. The Missouri statute also defined viability, required women to submit written 
certification of consent prior to an abortion, required spousal consent, prohibited saline 
amniocentesis, required physicians to maintain records and reports on abortions, and 
imposed an additional standard of care on physicians to preserve the life of the fetus. [d. 
at 58. 
28. [d. at 72. 
29. [d. at 73 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 93). 
30. [d. at 72-73 (quoting Brief for Appellee Danforth at 42). 
31. [d. at 73 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 
(E.D. Mo. 1975». 
32. [d. at 74. 
33. [d. 
6
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Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights."34 Nevertheless, neither the consti-
tutional rights of minors nor adults are unlimited.311 Further-
more, "the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the 
activities of children than adults."36 The standard for restricting 
the constitutional rights of adult women to seek and obtain an 
abortion is set forth in Roe.37 An adult woman's right to choose 
an abortion can be limited if supported by a compelling state 
interest. 38 However, because of the State's "broader authority" 
over the activities of minors,39 the Court in Danforth applied a 
lower level of scrutiny to determine whether a minor's constitu-
tional right to choose an abortion was violated by the parental 
consent requirement. The State was not required to demonstrate 
the compelling state interest which is required to support a re-
striction of the constitutional rights of adults. Instead, the State 
had to show a significant state interest in conditioning a minor's 
right to choose an abortion on the consent of a parent. 
One interest proposed as being sufficient to justify limita-
tions on a minor woman's right to obtain an abortion was the 
State's interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental au-
thority.40 The Court found that the statute did not serve those 
34. Id. (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(protections against double jeop-
ardy apply to juvenile court proceedings); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)(school dis-
ciplinary proceedings must respect due process); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969)(protected the freedom of speech of school children); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles being tried in juvenile court proceedings have a right to many of 
the procedural protections of due process». In Danforth, the Court operates under the 
assumption that the constitutional right to privacy, which includes the right to choose an 
abortion, extends to minors. However, the Court never addresses this issue nor provides 
any support for this assumption. 
35. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. The Court in Danforth stated that "[Roe) emphati-
cally rejected ... the proffered argument that the woman's right is absolute and that she 
is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for 
whatever reason she alone chooses." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 
153). 
36. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968». 
37. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
38. Id. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 
(1963». 
39. Danforth, 425 U.S. at 75 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968». 
40. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. The district court held that the State's interest in 
safeguarding the family unit and parental authority has a "compelling basis for allowing 
7
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interests. First, "providing a parent with absolute power to over-
rule a determination, made by the physician and his [or her] mi-
nor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy" will not 
strengthen the family unit. 41 Second, parental authority and 
control is not enhanced by a parent's veto power "where the mi-
nor and the non consenting parent are so fundamentally in con-
flict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has frac-
tured the family structure. "42 Permitting parents to override the 
young woman's decision would only worsen the situation. Thus, 
while the State may have had a significant interest in safeguard-
ing the family unit and parental authority, it failed to show how 
the blanket parental consent requirement, which granted the 
parent an absolute veto power over the pregnant minor's deci-
sion, promoted those interests. In the final analysis, the Court 
refused to allow the interests of the parents to outweigh those of 
the minor by stating that "[a]ny independent interest the parent 
may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy 
is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent 
minor mature enough to have become pregnant."43 
In Bellotti v. Baird,44 ("Bellotti (II)") the Court reaffirmed 
the position taken by Danforth and concluded that where a 
State enacts a parental consent statute, the State must also pro-
vide an alternative proceeding for minors who do not want pa-
rental involvement. The Court found that an alternative pro-
ceeding would avoid the harshness of an absolute veto power as 
discussed in Danforth and strike a balance between the minor's 
right to privacy and the interests of the State in protecting mi-
nors. Thus, the Court in Bellotti (II) had to determine what 
type of procedure should be afforded to minors who wish to ex-
ercise their right to choose an abortion free from parental 
consent. 
The Court held that the alternative proceeding must meet 
the following guidelines. The minor must be entitled to show: 
regulation of a minor's freedom to consent to an abortion." Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975)(emphasis added). 
41. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Supreme Court first heard Bellotti in 1976. See Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The case was argued at the same time as the Danforth 
case, but Bellotti (l) was remanded and reached the Supreme Court again in 1979. 
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"(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to 
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, 
independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is 
not able to make this decision independently, the desired abor-
tion would be in her best interests."45 In addition, the required 
proceeding "must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any 
appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and 
sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an 
abortion to be obtained."46 
The Court noted that a refusal to allow a minor the right to 
participate in the decision to have an abortion could have "grave 
and indelible" consequences.47 Unlike a decision to marry, which 
may be postponed by a minor until she reaches the age of major-
ity, the Court stated that a pregnant minor cannot postpone her 
decision to have an abortion. Though a minor should be allowed 
to participate in the decision making process, the Court recog-
nized that there could be instances in which· an abortion may 
not be in the best interest of the minor. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the possibility of situations in which a decision 
to have an abortion would be detrimental to the minor justified 
a requirement that the minor obtain either parental or judicial 
authorization for an abortion. 
The Bellotti (II) Court recognized that such a proceeding 
would place additional burdens on minors than those placed on 
adults who choose abortions. Such a distinction, as noted in 
Danforth, indicates that the privacy rights of minors may be 
treated differently than those of adults. However, the Court jus-
tified the added burden by distinguishing the constitutional 
rights of minors from those of adults on three grounds: "[1] the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and [3] the 
importance of the parental role in child rearing."48 The Court 
stated that" [d]uring the formative years of childhood and ado-
45. Id. at 643-44. 
46. Id. at 644. The judicial bypass procedure in Bellotti (II) was held unconstitu-
tional because the statute required that a parent must be given notice of any judicial 
proceedings brought by the minor to obtain the abortion. The Court held that this re-
quirement would impose an undue burden on minors. Id. at 646-47. 
47. Id. at 642. 
48. [d. at 634. 
9
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lescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimen-
tal to them. "49 Therefore, because many minors are unable to 
make crucial decisions, the Court concluded that "[s]tates val-
idly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves 
in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially 
serious consequences. 50 
The Court applied the requirements set forth in Bellotti 
(II) to invalidate a judicial bypass procedure in Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 51 This case involved a city 
ordinance "prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion 
on a minor pregnant woman under the age of 15 [sic] unless he 
obtains 'the informed written consent of one of her parents or 
her legal guardian' or unless the minor obtains 'an order ... that 
the abortion be performed or induced.' "52 The Court stated that 
the statute required "both the minor's informed consent and ei-
ther parental consent or a court order."53 The Court held that 
the effects of the ordinance were inconsistent with the principles 
of Bellotti (II) where the Court indicated that the purpose of a 
judicial bypass proceeding was to provide a substitute for paren-
tal consent. The Court determined that the ordinance did not 
provide a sufficient proceeding in which the minor could avoid a 
parental veto. Pursuant to the ordinance, the minor would be 
denied an opportunity to demonstrate her maturity. In effect, 
the ordinance presumes that all minors under the age of fifteen 
are too immature to make an abortion decision and that an 
abortion would never be in the best interest of the minor with-
out parental approval. 
The Court again applied the standards set forth in Bellotti 
(II) in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft.54 However, 
in Ashcroft, the Court upheld a Missouri statute that required 
that a minor obtain parental or judicial consent to an abortion.55 
The Court stated that because the "legal standards with respect 
49. [d. at 635. 
50. [d. 
51. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
52. [d. at 439 (citing Akron Codified Ordinances § 1870.05(B)). 
53. [d. at 439. 
54. 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 
55. Jd. at 481. 
10
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to parental-consent requirements are not in dispute,"1!6 the issue 
in Ashcroft is one of statutory construction under Bellotti (II). 
The statute required the Court to consider evidence regarding 
"the emotional development, maturity, intellect and under-
standing of the minor,"117 as well as any other evidence that 
would be "useful in determining whether the minor should be 
granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the 
abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the 
minor."58 The Court held that the statute was constitutional 
under Bellotti (II) because the statute provided an alternative 
proceeding in which the minor could avoid an absolute veto and 
avoid parental involvement. 
The Court also upheld the parental notification and consent 
statute in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 1I9 The 
statute required the minor to file a complaint in the juvenile 
court stating, among other things, that "she has sufficient ma-
turity and information to make an intelligent decision whether 
to have an abortion without ... notice, or that one of her par-
ents has engaged in a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional 
abuse against her, or that notice is not in her best interest."6o 
The minor would be required to prove that she possessed suffi-
cient maturity by clear and convincing evidence, and a guardian 
ad litem and an attorney would be appointed by the court to 
represent the minor and to protect her anonymity. 
The statute further required that the juvenile court hold the 
hearing as soon as possible, but riot later than the fifth business 
day after the complaint is filed. The failure to render a decision 
immediately after the hearing would result in constructive au-
thorization for the minor to obtain an abortion. 
The Court upheld the Ohio statute because it satisfied the 
requirements of Bellotti (II).61 First, the statute permitted the 
56. Id. at 490 
57. Id. at 479, nA (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 2(3». 
58.Id. 
59. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990). 
60. Id. at 2977. The minor must also state in the complaint: "(I) that she is preg-
nant; (2) that she is unmarried, under 18 years of age, and unemancipated; (3) that she 
desires to have an abortion without notifying one of her parents; ... and (4) that she has 
or has not retained an attorney." Id. 
6!. Several justices dissented in Ohio v. Akron. Justice Blackmun, with whom Jus-
11
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minor to show that she possessed sufficient maturity to make 
the decision. Second, where the minor was unable to demon-
strate sufficient maturity, the statute allowed the minor to show 
that the abortion was in her best interest. Third, the procedure 
was required to be conducted in a manner that would assure the 
minor's anonymity. Finally, the bypass procedure would be con-
ducted expeditiously or, more specifically, within five business 
days after the complaint was filed. 
Ohio v. Akron indicates that since Bellotti (II), the require-
ments for determining the constitutionality of parental consent 
statutes are clear. A statute must permit the minor to demon-
strate her maturity or show an abortion is in her best interests. 
Therefore, parental consent statutes must be analyzed on a case-
by-case basis under the requirements set forth in Bellotti (II). 
The Supreme Court cases that have considered the issue of 
parental consent statutes have indicated that under the federal 
constitution a minor's right to privacy is more narrowly inter-
preted than that of adults. Although adult women must adhere 
to the trimester guidelines set forth in Roe, minors who seek 
abortions may, constitutionally, have the additional burden of 
seeking parental or judicial consent. 
C. CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL CONSENT PROVISION PURSUANT To 
THE SUPREME COURT CASES 
Although "[a]ny attempt to analyze the constitutionality of 
parental consent statutes is difficult because of the intensely 
personal, conflicting constitutional interest involved,"62 Califor-
nia Health and Safety Code Section 25958 ("Section 25958")63 
tice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, stated in the dissent that "[t)he challenged 
provisions of the Ohio statute [were) merely 'poorly disguised elements of discourage-
ment for the abortion decision.' " Id. at 2985 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986). 
62. L. WARDLE, supra note 23, at 162. 
63. California Health & Safety Code § 25958 states that: 
(a) Except in a medical emergency requiring immediate medi-
cal action, no abortion shall be performed upon an unemanci-
pated minor unless she first has given her written consent to 
the abortion and also has obtained the written consent of one 
of her parents or legal guardian. 
(b) If one or both of an unemancipated, pregnant minor's par-
12
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presents relatively little difficultly in analysis under the Su-
ents or her guardian refuse to consent to the performance of 
an abortion, or if the minor elects not to seek the consent of 
one or both of her parents or her guardian, an unemancipated 
pregnant minor may file a petition with the juvenile court. If, 
pursuant to this subdivision, a minor seeks a petition, the 
court shall assist the minor or person designated by the minor 
in preparing the petition and notices required pursuant to this 
section. The petition shall set forth with specificity the mi-
nor's reasons for the request. The court shall ensure that the 
minor's identity is confidential. The minor may file the peti-
tion using only her initials or a pseudonym. An unemanci-
pated pregnant minor may participate in the proceedings in 
juvenile court on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a 
guardian ad litem for her. The court shall, however, advise her 
that she has a right to court-appointed counsel upon request. 
The hearing shall be set within three days of the filing of the 
petition. A notice shall be given to the minor of the date, time, 
and place of the hearing on the petition. 
(c) At the hearing on a minor's petition brought pursuant to 
subdivision (b) for the authorization of an abortion, the court 
shall consider all evidence duly presented, and order either of 
the following: 
(1) If the court finds that the minor is sufficiently mature 
and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own re-
garding an abortion,a nd that the minor has, on that basis, 
consented thereto, the court shall grant the petition. 
(2) If the court finds that the minor is not sufficiently ma-
ture and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own 
regarding an abortion, the court shall then consider whether 
performance of the abortion would be in the best interest of 
the minor. In the event that the court finds that the perform-
ance of the abortion would be in the minor's best interest, the 
court shall grant the petition ordering the performance of the 
abortion without consent of, or notice to, the parents or guard-
ian. In the event that the court finds that the performance of 
the abortion is not in the best interest of the minor, the court 
shall deny the petition. 
Judgment shall be entered within one court day of submission 
of the matter. 
(d) The minor may appeal the judgment of the juvenile court 
by filing a written notice of appeal at any time after the entry 
of the judgment .... 
(e) No fees or· costs incurred in connection with the procedures 
required by this section shall be chargeable to the minor or 
her parents . . . . 
(f) It is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the 
county jail of up to 30 days, or both, for any person to know-
ingly perform an abortion on an unmarried or unemancipated 
minor without complying with the requirements of this 
section. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1989). 
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preme Court cases because California's parental consent statute 
strictly adheres to the guidelines set forth in Danforth and its 
progeny. Consistent with Danforth, California's statute does not 
impose an absolute veto power which may be exercised by some-
one other than the pregnant minor and her physician. The stat-
ute provides that if the minor's parents refuse to grant their 
consent, the minor may file a petition with the juvenile court for 
a hearing on whether she may avoid the parental consent re-
quirement. The statute states that "[i]f one or both of an un-
emancipated, pregnant minor's parents ... refuse to consent to 
the performance of an abortion, ... an unemancipated pregnant 
minor may file a petition with the juvenile court."64 By provid-
ing the minor with an alternative proceeding, California has sat-
isfied the requirements of Danforth because no one has an abso-
lute veto power over the minor's' abortion decision. 
However, the sufficiency of California's judicial bypass pro-
cedure must be examined under the requirements set forth in 
Bellotti (II). First, as noted earlier, Bellotti (II) requires that 
the minor have an opportunity to demonstrate that she is ma-
ture enough to decide independently to have an abortion. Cali-
fornia's statute provides that if the court finds that the minor is 
mature and informed enough to make the decision on her own, 
the petition for an abortion shall be granted. 611 By providing the 
minor with an opportunity to demonstrate her maturity to ob-
tain an abortion without parental consent, the first requirement 
is met. 
Second, Bellotti (II) requires that the statute protect the 
rights of those minors who would be unable to demonstrate suf-
ficient maturity. Section 25958 satisfies this requirement be-
cause it provides that if the court finds that the minor is not 
mature enough to make the decision on her own, the court will 
consider whether an abortion would be in her best interest. 
Third, Bellotti (II) requires that the proceeding ensure the 
minor's anonymity. Section 25958 states that the minor may file 
the petition using only her initials or a pseudonym. Fourth, the 
judicial procedure under Section 25958 would satisfy the re-
64. Id. at § 25958(b). 
65. Id. 
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quirement that the proceeding be conducted expeditiously be-
cause the statute states that the hearing will be set within three 
days from the date the petition is filed. 
Similar to the provision in Ohio v. Akron, under Section 
25958, the minor may be appointed an attorney to represent her 
during the proceeding. In addition, the California statute pro-
vides that the court will assist the minor in preparing the neces-
sary petitions. 
Although Section 25958 satisfies Bellotti II, two fundamen-
tal questions should also be addressed when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of parental consent statutes: (1) whether the state 
has a significant interest in requiring parental consent; and (2) 
whether the parental consent statute will likely enhance any sig-
nificant state interest.66 
Based on California's legislative history, California enacted 
Section 25958 because California had an interest in protecting 
minors. The California legislature found that: 
[1] the medical, emotional, and psychological con-
sequences of an abortion are serious and can be 
lasting, particularly when the patient is an imma-
ture minor; [2] the capacity to become pregnant 
and the capacity for exercising mature judgment 
concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not log-
ically related; [3] minors often lack the ability to 
make fully informed choices that take account of 
both immediate and long-range consequences of 
their actions; [4] parents ordinarily possess infor-
mation essential to a physician's exercise of his or 
her best medical judgment concerning a minor 
child; and [5] parents who are aware that their 
minor daughter has had an abortion may better 
ensure that she receives adequate medical atten-
tion subsequent to her abortion.67 
Each of California's legislative findings addresses some type 
of concern for the welfare of the minor. These findings suggest 
66. L. WARDLE, supra note 23, at 169. 
67. Historical Note, Cal. Civ. Code § 34.5 (West Supp. 1990)(quoting Section 1, 
Stats. 1987, c. 1237). 
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that California enacted its parental consent statute because it 
had an interest in protecting minors from their own immaturity. 
As one authority states, "[l]ittle discussion is needed to illus-
trate that the state interest in protecting minors against their 
own immaturity is a significant state interest. "68 Courts have re-
peatedly recognized that a state has a significant interest in pro-
tecting minors.69 
California's parental consent statute is also likely to further 
the State's interest in protecting minors. The purpose of Califor-
nia's parental consent statute is to protect minors from decisions 
based on immaturity and lack of experience. Therefore, by re-
quiring parental involvement, the State is assured of adult par-
ticipation in the decision process. The statute assumes, however, 
that the adult is capable of offering mature guidance to the mi-
nor. Because Section 25958 strictly complies with the Supreme 
Court cases and because California has a legitimate interest in 
protecting minors, it is likely that California's statute would be 
upheld under federal law. 
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPRESS RIGHT To PRIVACY CON-
TAINED IN CALIFORNIA'S STATE CONSTITUTION 
Although California's parental consent statute would likely 
be upheld under federal law, Section 25958 seems to violate Cal-
ifornia state law. Unlike federal law, which distinguishes the 
rights of minors from those of adults, California does not distin-
guish among the rights of its citizens. The California Constitu-
tion contains an express right to privacy provision that applies 
equally to all California residents. Thus, because the rights of 
minors may not be distinguished from those of adults in Califor-
nia, a minor may not have additional burdens placed upon her 
decision to have an abortion than those placed on an adult 
woman.70 
68. L. WARDLE, supra note 23, at 170. 
69. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52. 
70. Two law journal arguments have been written regarding the constitutionality of 
California's parental consent statute. Both authors concluded that Section 25958 vio-
lated the California Constitution. See Comment, Aborting the Rights of Minors? Ques-
tioning the ConstitutionaLity of California's ParentaL Consent Statute 19 Pac. L.J. 1487 
(1988)(concluding that California's parental consent statute violates both the United 
States and the California Constitutions); Comment, Eroding Roe: The Politics and Con-
16
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The right to privacy guaranteed under the California Con-
stitution has been more broadly interpreted than the federal 
right to privacy. Article I, Section 1 provides that "[ aJll people 
are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoining and defending life and liberty,. ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness and privacy."71 
California courts have emphasized that "the rights defined 
[in the California Constitution] are not mirror images of their 
federal counterparts."72 Based on the concept of federalism, "the 
California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of 
independent force."73 The "rights guaranteed by [the California] 
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution."74 As a result, California courts 
should be "informed but untrammeled by the United States Su-
preme Court's reading of parallel federal provisions."7~ Accord-
ingly, California state courts may declare a state statute uncon-
stitutional under state law, notwithstanding the fact that the 
statute would be upheld under federal law. 
In this instance, California's parental consent statute ap-
pears to be unconstitutional under the California Constitution 
for two reasons: (1) California's right to privacy does not distin-
guish between the rights of adults and minors;76 and (2) in Cali-
fornia, the appropriate standard to determine the constitutional-
ity of the parental consent statute should be a compelling state 
interest, which the State is unlikely to demonstrate. 
stitutionality of California's Parental Consent Abortion Statqte 20 Pac. L.J. 1167 
(1989). 
71. Cal. Const. Art. I, §1 (West 1983)(emphasis added). 
72. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 839, 
263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 49 (1989)(citing Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 
29 Cal. 3d 252, 261, 625 P.2d 779, 1099, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981». 
73. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
315, 329 (1975). 
74. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 24 (West 1983). 
75. American Academy of Pediatrics, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 839, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 
49 (1989)(citing Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 525, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
774 (1976». 
76. The express right to privacy clause was added in 1972 when California voters 
passed an amendment to the state constitution to guarantee the right to privacy to all 
California citizens. 
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California law has long recognized that the right to privacy 
extends to the decision whether to undergo childbirth.77 This 
right to privacy, which· includes the right to choose an abortion, 
makes no distinction between the rights of minors and those of 
adults.78 The California privacy provision expressly applies to 
"all people" which includes minors. 
Several California court decisions reflect that the general 
concepts of privacy under the California Constitution readily ap-
ply to minors.79 These courts have held that minors may bring a 
tort action for invasion of privacy,80 enjoy a state constitutional 
privacy right against unreasonable searches and seizures,8} and 
have a similar right against school officials standing in loco 
parentis.82 
In American Academy of Pediatrics u. Van De Kamp,83 the 
California court stated that the rights of minors may not be dis-
tinguished from those of adults in California and that the state 
must still show a compelling state interest where privacy rights 
are burdened.84 In American Academy of Pediatrics, the court 
expressed doubt with respect to the constitutionality of a paren-
tal consent statute in California. The plaintiff contended that 
California's parental consent statute was unconstitutional under 
the California Constitution. The court considered whether the 
superior court had abused its discretion by granting a prelimi-
nary injunction preventing the implementation of California's 
parental consent to abortion statute. 
Although the court did not rule on the merits of the case, 
one of the factors in determining whether the lower court 
abused its discretion was whether the plaintiff was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits. Thus, the court discussed the merits of the 
77. 214 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 51. 
78. Id. at 844, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 53. 
79. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 277, 
226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (1986). 
80. Vescovo v. New Way Enters., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 587-88, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 
(1976). 
81. In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Gal. Rptr. 671 (1979). 
82. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 560-61, 709 P.2d, 1287, 1292-93, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
118, 123-24. 
83. 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989). 
84. Id. at 844, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 53. 
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case and held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting the injunction because the plaintiff was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits of the case. 
In reaching its decision to grant the injunction, the court 
considered several of the plaintiff's arguments with respect to 
the unconstitutionality of a parental consent statute in Califor-
nia. The court stated that "California's Constitution ... does 
not distinguish between the right of privacy of adults and chil-
dren; it provides that the right of privacy is guaranteed to all 
persons. "85 Because the rights of minors are not distinguished 
from those of adults in California, the court stated that "the test 
remains whether the burden on the privacy right is justified by a 
compelling state interest."86 The court rejected the argument 
that a lower level of scrutiny should be applied to minors.87 The 
court recognized that federal courts may apply a lower level of 
scrutiny, but concluded that the federal courts reached this de-
termination based on the way in which they interpreted the 
United States Constitution. Unlike the United States Constitu-
tion, California's Constitution has been interpreted differently. 
The court stated that where a regulation will unequally af-
fect the fundamental rights of persons, it must meet a three-part 
test.88 First, the State must prove that the imposed conditions 
relate to the purpose of the legislation.89 Second, the utility of 
the conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impair-
ment of constitutional rights. 90 Third, the State must establish 
the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrate 
that the conditions are drawn narrowly.91 
California is likely to be able to show that the parental con-
sent statute relates to the purpose of the legislation. As stated 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. (citing Rider v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 278, 282-83, 244 Cal. Rptr. 
770, 772-73 (1988». In Rider, the court applied a compelling state interest test when 
considering the privacy rights of a fourteen year old alleged rape victim. 
88. American Academy of Pediatrics, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 54. 
This three part test was established in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 
65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966). 
89. American Academy of Pediatrics, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 54. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
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earlier, the purpose of the legislation is to protect minors from 
their own immaturity. The statute relates to that purpose be-
cause the statute ensures adult involvement. 
However, California may have greater difficulty showing 
that the usefulness or benefit of a parental consent requirement 
manifestly outweighs the impairment of a minor's right to 
choose an abortion. In American Academy of Pediatrics, there 
was evidence regarding the effect of an abortion and the effect of 
an inability to decide to procure an abortion. There was evi-
dence that reducing the minor's ability to decide increased stress 
and depression and that most minors were frightened of court 
proceedings. Other significant evidence included that: some mi-
nors will choose to undergo illegal abortions rather than reveal 
their pregnancies to their parents or to a judge; many minors are 
correct in their assessment of the negative results that would oc-
cur from disclosure; many minors will delay their decisions be-
cause of difficulty in access to the court; and that most minors 
are aware of their medical histories and do not need the assis-
tance of an adult. 
After reviewing the evidence, the court stated that the three 
part test was largely a factual matter that they would not con-
sider. The court concluded that an order issuing an injunction 
would not be reversed because "the superior court reasonably 
could have believed that there [was] a likelihood that the [State 
would] not meet their burden of proving at trial that the dis-
crimination inherent in [the parental consent statute] is justifia-
ble."92 American Academy of Pediatrics indicates that at least 
one California court has considered the potential unconstitution-
ality of Section 25958. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In summary, California courts are independently responsi-
ble for protecting the rights of its citizens.93 This independent 
92. [d. at 55. 
93. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261, 625 
P.2d 779, 783, 172 Cal. Rptr., 866, 870 (1981)(citing People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 
550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329). 
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responsibility is likely to have been the force that prompted Cal-
ifornia to adopt an express right to privacy clause. The decision 
to adopt an express right to privacy distinguishes California 
from federal law in two significant respects: (1) California citi-
zens are afforded more protection because their right to privacy 
is interpreted more broadly; and (2) California has a greater ob-
ligation to its citizens when enacting legislation. 
This greater obligation means that California, in many in-
stances, is more limited in its ability to enact regulations, as 
seen in the case of parental consent statutes. Notwithstanding 
the fact that California's parental consent statute may be con-
sidered valid under the United States Constitution, California 
must hold itself to the higher standard which it has adopted 
under the California Constitution. This higher standard de-
mands that minors be afforded the same degree of privacy as 
adults and that the same degree of scrutiny be applied in deter-
mining whether a minor's rights have been violated. 
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